Photo: Paul Rudderow

Three back systems are en vogue again. But after years of jamming the center by pulling from the front line, some managers are snatching a defender out of the back line in order to better control wide areas. Perhaps the most successful purveyor of three-back play is Chelsea’s Antonio Conte, whose Italy side re-introduced a dynamic version of the concept to the world stage during Euro 2016.

Though already creeping up through the German leagues and even deployed by Pep Guardiola on occasion, shapes with three central defenders are still in a nascent stage of re-emergence. That is to say, only a few managers regularly find success with it, and they are generally extremely talented tacticians.

Let’s start by looking at how Antonio Conte’s Chelsea have taken the English Premier League by storm, then examine whether a similar system would be effective for Philadelphia Union.

Conte’s 3-4-3 at Chelsea, from Spielverlagerung.

Conte stop them, only hope to contain them: Defense

Chelsea’s 3-4-3 is not Italy’s 3-4-3. In Euro 2016, Italy typically played with a lone holding midfielder who protected the back three, interacting with the defense through short passes to create time for the talented Juventus men to ping longer passes once a defense stepped up and stretched its shape. Two inside midfielders and two wingbacks shuttled constantly between attack and defense, with the entire team man-marking out of possession. This meant that if an opponent didn’t counterattack quickly, Italy could push wingbacks forward to close down the opposing fullbacks high up the pitch and dominate the wide areas, forcing teams to play through a strong, resilient center.

Conte now plays with two holding midfielders because a) he doesn’t have Juventus’ ultra-talented back line, b) it allows him to use a more attack-minded wingback on the right, and c) it frees up Eden Hazard to do special things. The key attributes of Chelsea’s holding midfielders are their mobility and intelligence. Both N’Golo Kante and Nemanja Matic cover a lot of ground and show an incredible ability to snuff out counterattacks with smart positioning high up the pitch (more on this later).

With the mids well-positioned, opposing teams struggle to play transition passes into good areas. This allows the right- and left-central defenders to feel safe stepping up to man-mark attackers even if it means stretching the defensive unit. If a team does manage to establish possession in Chelsea’s final third, the wingbacks drop into the back line to form a back five, the holding midfielders clog the center, and one of the inside attackers drops toward the middle to form something like a 5-2-1-2.

Conte stop them, only hope to contain them: Attack

That’s a lot of bodies back. So how do Chelsea attack? This is where it becomes even more important to have players with very specific skillsets on the pitch. The “positional play” theory that forms the backbone of Pep Guardiola’s philosophy argues that a team can gain superiority over an opponent in three ways: Numerical superiority (having more players around the ball), positional superiority (dominating the dangerous spaces), and qualitative superiority (having better/the right players). Chelsea’s success is built in no small way on the qualitative superiority they gain through David Luiz (I know!) and Eden Hazard.

Luiz is an enigmatic central defender. His speed, aerial prowess, and passing range are unique, but his errors under pressure have been a persistent drag on his game. By placing Luiz in the center of his back three, Conte keeps the entire game in front of the Brazilian, which simplifies what Luiz has to think about. Furthermore, it creates an extra few yards of space so Luiz isn’t immediately under pressure when he receives the ball. This alleviates many of the issues that have plagued the defender while simultaneously allowing him to express his phenomenal skill on the ball.

Eden Hazard also has what Liam Neeson would recognize as a unique set of skills. Perhaps only Alexis Sanchez and Coutinho can rival the Belgian’s ability to receive the ball facing away from goal and beat a man without presenting the ball to an opponent. Hazard’s agility means he can often use his body shape to twist away from a defender when receiving the ball facing backwards and under pressure. This means that while most players would need to recycle play when collecting a ball 35 yards from goal facing away, Hazard requires no support. He invokes Rambo and goes it alone, twisting free and immediately threatening a defense. Thanks to the diminutive Belgian attacker, Chelsea can pack their defense but still regularly get forward with only a few bodies positioned upfield.

Of course, the Blues are heavily assisted by Diego Costa’s absurd goalscoring form, as well.

Effective, but not common

Clearly, there is a lot to like about the 3-4-3. It can provide a stout defensive shape and let a team dominate the wide areas the way many modern teams attempt to control the center. Numerical overloads on the outside with the wingbacks, inside forwards, and mobile central midfielders pull defenses wide in the final third, meaning Chelsea have an easier route through the middle. There is still strength in the center defensively, and the sit-deep-and-counter systems that have found some success against the aggressive pressing of other top managers struggle against Chelsea’s active holding mids and central defense.

Yet few other teams regularly deploy a 3-4-3, and even fewer do it effectively. Why?

For starters, it’s weird! Nearly all central defenders develop in four-back systems, meaning their automatic, semi- and non-conscious cues are built on years of protecting specific channels. Suddenly there is another guy between the two center backs: The channels to cover are different, the protection around them is different, and the vertical space they are responsible for is far different. This means that any coach hoping to deploy a three-back system must not only be able to explain the new roles to his defense, but also drill those roles and responsibilities into the defenders so they react as if they grew up playing with three in the back. This is, needless to say, pretty tough. Many managers have aped the high-pressure concepts of the legendary Marcelo Bielsa, but few have found sustained, trophy-collecting success with the Argentine’s high-risk, high-reward 3-3-1-3 or its variants.

Recently, Everton attempted to match Chelsea with a 3-4-3 shape that let them man-mark all over the pitch. Predictably, locking Gareth Barry and Tom Cleverly onto Hazard and Pedro didn’t work out too well.

However, Tottenham matched Chelsea’s shape and broke the Blues 13-match winning streak by smothering Hazard with mobile destroyer Victor Wanyama. Tottenham then exposed a key weakness in Chelsea’s system by attacking the space left behind Hazard with Christian Eriksen (as Dele Alli pulled defenders away from that area). Tottenham then looked to challenge Chelsea’s shortest defender in the air, and succeeded. Notably, Tottenham is one of the few sides in all of Europe that can boast three mobile, ball-playing center backs. And manager Mauricio Pochettino took a page from Conte by switching his defenders to put long pass specialist Toby Alderweireld in the center of defense to give him more space and time to look around.

All of this is to say that the idea of a three-back system is intriguing, and even compelling. And it can meet many of the same needs as Philly’s current 4-2-3-1. Wingbacks provide width in attack, inside forwards can attack the center of a defense, and two holding midfielders protect the back line.

But like the high press system that both propelled Philly up the 2016 Eastern Conference table and was somewhat responsible for their late season freefall, it requires just the right combination of players and excellent coaching to succeed with regularity (those managers who selectively deploy three-back systems, like Andre Schubert (formerly) of Borussia Monchengladbach, tend to possess extremely intelligent, dynamic holding midfielders who can effectively drop into the back and create a four-back look in defense (without Granit Xhaka to play this role, Gladbach have sssstruggled)).

So should Philly look at a three-back system this year?

Likely no, though there are certain aspects of it that seem to fit the Union roster. First, placing Joshua Yaro as the central defender could allow the young technician additional space to spread play and help the Union bypass high pressure. However, Yaro’s height would be a liability, whereas blending technique and aerial dominance has been something of a requirement for the middle defender in these shapes.

Additionally, the Union would be relying heavily on Richie Marquez and either Ken Tribbett or a new, veteran signing to handle the complex responsibilities of the right- and left- center backs. These responsibilities include stepping forward to close down counters, carrying the ball toward midfield to disrupt defensive shapes, and selectively joining offensive sets to provide a short, quick outlet when a center midfielder moves wide to create triangles near the edge of the box. If you think learning those skills will be easy, just look at the US men’s national team’s recent three-back faceplant against Mexico that ended the Dos-A-Cero run.

Further upfield, Philly can run with Warren Creavalle and Brian Carroll. Combining Creavalle’s mobility with Carroll’s positioning would be nice, but impossible. The Union also had major issues supporting wide areas with Creavalle and Carroll last season, and such support would be crucial for the success of a system built to dominate the areas of the pitch many modern systems treat as secondary. Additionally, Philly’s coaching staff has had issues imparting good transition-defense principles in the holding midfielders. Below, you can see the start of two transitions. First, Bedoya wins a header in his own box, but Felipe is shadowing the lane to Fabian Herbers and keeps play in the Union final third. Note also that Dax McCarty is positioned up the heart of the pitch, shadowing the lane to the Union striker. Thus, it is very difficult for Philly to make a clean, quick transition from defense to attack.

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Next, New Jersey attempts to transition out of their box against the Union. First, kudos to Fabian Herbers for executing a quick counterpress on Felipe after a turnover. However, the Brazilian is untroubled by this pressure because he has a (pause. breath.) unbelievably simple connection to Sacha Kljestan available up the center of the pitch. Wha??

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The most blame falls on Tranquillo Barnetta’s shoulders. Unlike a Guardiola side, the Union do not pull their fullbacks narrow to prevent dangerous transition starters, so the midfield must shadow lanes to the attackers; Barnetta is far from where he should be.

This is not a Barnetta problem, though. Throughout the latter half of the 2016 season, the Union consistently allowed teams to play easy balls into the feet of dangerous attackers in transition. Perhaps the most complete failure to control transitions came in Portland, where the Timbers found Fanendo Adi a simple and reliable outlet.

In Alejandro Bedoya and Roland Alberg, the Union have two players capable of playing as inside forwards, though neither possesses the skill set to create their own space or consistently turn a man with their back to goal. This means Philly would be almost entirely reliant on these players collecting the ball and connecting with a wide runner to generate forward momentum.

Finally, even with Jay Simpson added to the roster, the Union cannot yet say they boast a striker who can consistently occupy two central defenders with quick, diagonal movements and hold-up play.

In short, the Union’s roster as currently constructed, and as it could reasonably be expected to be constructed in March, is likely not amenable to an effective three-back system that is both defensively solid and offensively capable. At best, Philly could put out a high pressing team that leaves gaps in back while hoping to coordinate an effective closing-down in the opponent’s half. Sounds… eerily similar to the latter half of 2016.

There is one last issue that was noted in yesterday’s article and pointed at earlier in this one. Effective three-back systems that allow a team to punch above their weight (and that was both what drew attention to Conte’s Italy and what the Union need in order to compete with teams that, quite frankly, will be loaded with more talent) are managed by elite, or at the very least excellent managers. This is not a knock on Jim Curtin. But it is a clear-eyed recognition that the Union are led by a young coach who, while admiring the high pressure systems of those like Pochettino, comes from a MLS tradition that is far different. Even Jesse Marsch, a talented high press advocate, requires a certain type of player in midfield and up top to succeed. If Curtin wanted to implement a three-back shape, he would need both different players and the ability to impart on those players the automatic decision-making skills they need to play as an eleven-man machine. For all the praise Curtin should receive for his ability to make the postseason with a roster that was, subtracting Mo Edu and Vincent Nogueira, in no way more talented (except in goal, perhaps) than the clubs that missed the playoffs, the Union head man has yet to show he can grow players into a system such that they make each role their own.

Thus, three in the back should be far from the minds of Union fans in 2017 and likely the foreseeable future.

Next, we’ll look at whether a two-striker system could aid the Union’s chances in the upcoming season.