Photo: Earl Gardner

Last week, Philadelphia Union were soundly beaten in the wide areas by Columbus, then used their wing play to effectively turn the tables on the Crew. Jay Heaps watched both games and took away some powerful lessons.

He learned that the Union center backs tend to get pushed behind their fullbacks by the threat of deep runs. He also learned that Philly’s once-effective counterpress has showed little of its former verve since the Gold Cup break.

Finally, and perhaps most forebodingly, he learned that if you keep the Union in front of you, they can’t generate offense — in fact, they pull themselves apart.

Simple as it gets

For all their attacking talent, New England Revolution do not have an effective way to move the ball through midfield (especially with Xavier Kouassi out). Recognizing his roster’s deficiency, Jay Heaps decided to play to his team’s strengths and bypass the middle with angled long balls to the strikers.

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If the Union had been quicker and more coordinated in their counterpressing, they may have dented the effectiveness of the Revs approach. But a frantic, rattled visiting squad was slow to pressure the ball after turnovers, and they were unable to prevent New England from playing a first pass out of trouble and blasting a ball toward the far touchline.

But credit to Heaps — the Revs worked to create the space they targeted.  

Columbus laid bare an issue that has dogged the Union for quite some time: The fullbacks tend to become very man-oriented (particularly in the moments following transitions) and will follow a mark out of their space. Additionally, Philly’s center backs are at their most exposed by far when marking in space, so they prefer to stay fairly central. New England exploited this by sending an attacker on something of a curl route from the center to the wing to drag the far side fullback high. Another attacker — often Kei Kamara or Teal Bunbury — would then rotate across the pitch into the hole to the outside of the center back.

An unconvincing response

If the Union had been compact defensively, this approach may not have worked, since the fullback could have handed off the attacker to a midfielder or the center back could have strode forward to challenge the aerial ball. New England was clearly aware of the need to play away from Onyewu and Jack Elliott if they wanted to go long, and by dragging the defenders into wide areas, New England made the Philly backs very aware of angled runs and more hesitant to step forward and challenge balls into the center.

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Above, the Revs easily play a ball through Philly’s spacious midfield without receiving any pressure. Then, they rotate to the right and find Wijnaldum leaning toward Farrell on the touchline while the center backs hold a far deeper line. To be exposed once on a single play is rough; twice hurts (and leads to yellow cards).

And, since much of the beauty of soccer derives from how offense and defense can be blended together to enhance each other, it follows that the sport’s ugliness often flows from the two pulling against each other.

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Indeed, Philly’s desire to move the ball forward quickly away from home put too much strain on the defensive shape and by the time New England doubled their lead they were playing in enough space to feel justified giving each other astronaut nicknames (if you listened closely, you could hear Lee Nguyen yell, “Way to go, Buzz!” when Juan Agudelo cut one of the final anchors off the Union’s playoff ship.)

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Perhaps no play sums up Philly’s night better than the one above. First, there is no attempt to recover shape, meaning the Union start with essentially a 4-2-4 shape spread over nearly half the pitch. The Revs easily play through lines, but, luckily, Kei Kamara is not a great passer (as he showed multiple times on the night). Bedoya can therefore create a turnover in a good position.

Alberg’s first pass off the turnover, unfortunately, is a poor one. Even if C.J. Sapong collects it, he will need to play a well-weighted pass behind an onrushing defender while spinning. Doable, but hardly as useful as if the Dutch attacker had drawn in his defender, played a simple ball to Bedoya, and let his side rush at the opponent with numbers. Yet, because the Revs are not really sure what to do when they’re doing well, they give the ball right back…only for Gaddis to push the ball in front of him and…sigh. You get the idea.

Rough night for Roland

For those that wonder what Philadelphia Union would look like in a 4-4-2, find a friend with MLS Live and watch last night’s match. The Sapong-Alberg partnership stayed fairly close together, but the Dutchman was rarely connected to the deeper midfielders.

This was just one issue on a lengthy list for Alberg on the night. On a club that dominates possession and needs to break down deep blocks, Philly’s sitting striker might be quite the addition. His shot is quick and dangerous, and he tends to be far more motivated to find space when operating in congested areas.

But on the Union, a team that so baldly needs a link between defense and attack that can establish extended possessions in the opponent’s half, Alberg is a misfit. He is more than capable of playing a wonderful pass when he finds himself in good positions, but when out of those positions he seems tragically uninterested in discovering them.

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Take the play above, where Alberg earns a foul in a good position. Earlier in the play, when Bedoya was zooming upfield with only Gershon Koffie between him and the Revs’ back four, Alberg can’t seem to find a passing lane. If he gets free, he can line up that powerful right peg instead of receiving an aerial ball with his back to goal.

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Above, you can see another issue that makes Alberg a poor fit for the linking role. After helping his side transition, the Dutchman moves up the pitch, but once there he doesn’t have the vision to recognize his advantageous position on the left. When Epps plays the ball inside, Alberg can run at Andrew Farrell and create a 2v1 with Marcus Epps. It’s an easy play to see from a distance, but it’s not actually the easiest advantage to see on field. The catch is that a creator would see it, and Alberg is not that.

This might matter less if Alberg were playing as an attacking midfielder. But he isn’t. The defensive effort comes and goes, and when it comes it involves sprints, not positioning. Sometimes this doesn’t destroy the Union’s shape, but Saturday it was costly because of New England’s long ball approach.

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The Revs were set up to collect second balls and establish possession in the Union’s half. This meant that Philly was often running backward then pinned fairly deep and giving up a lot of space in their own half. To prevent the Revs from easily moving the ball around and pulling their shape apart, the Union needed Alberg to slide back defensively to, if nothing else, fill horizontal passing lanes.

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Above, you can see that even if he simply comes back and plays at half-speed, Alberg can offer defensive help. If he does not come back, Haris Medunjanin gets sucked over toward the ball, leaving the center exposed. Instead, New England settles for a cross.

The final conundrum Alberg presented involves New England’s use of Gershon Koffie as a shield for their back line. Koffie both wanted to cut out Alberg as a transition link and protect the center. The Union’s number 10 could have made him choose between the two, but instead tended to stay central and high, allowing Koffie to cut him out as an outlet.

In fact, the main contribution Ilsinho made after coming on was to move Koffie around and expose just how stretched New England got defensively.

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Ilsinho also showed how an attacking mid can help hold the ball in the attacking zone by checking short to the fullbacks, but Gaddis, unused to the support, played an ill-advised cross instead of finding the Brazilian in space.

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Overall, the Union were second best but still could have come away with points if they had held possession in New England’s half. The Revs remain a deeply flawed team, particularly when using Kelyn Rowe in defense, yet the Union were unable to seriously threaten and needed a defender to make a save for the second straight match.

And for all the criticism leveled at Roland Alberg, he was the only Union player with a key pass in the first half.

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