Photo: 215pix

Three-back systems are en vogue right now. And rightly so: Center backs are taking on more distributive duties, and fullbacks were already asked to cover entire flanks, so when jamming the center became commonplace, managers looked wide for relief.

Columbus Crew is relatively new to the three-back game, but Gregg Berhalter’s reliance on advanced fullbacks and central defenders with passing range meant he had the basic tools on hand from the start of the season. Adding Kekuta Manneh gave Berhalter a second winger comfortable playing inside, and with Federico Higuain injured the 3-4-3 provides a good fit for the current roster.

After the match, Jim Curtin said, “They came out in a 3-4-3. We actually had their lineup and were prepared for them to play that way with [Federico] Higuain being out.”

Indeed, there were early signs that the Union had a good plan of attack. In the seventh minute, Philly drew Justin Meram high defensively, and when Jukka Raitala, the left wingback, stepped to Ray Gaddis, Josh Yaro bypassed him. Marcus Epps had smartly moved high into the space behind Raitala, pitting him against Lalas Abubakar, who was drawn out of the center to cover. As a result, Columbus retreated and left Haris Medunjanin in space. Great!

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Moments later, Philly pinned Justin Meram deep by moving Ale Bedoya into the right channel and pushing Ray Gaddis upfield. This meant Meram could not step to Yaro, and the Union had a 3v2 in the first line with Medunjanin again granted time to slip a pass through the lines to Jay Simpson. (The pass at the end is not necessarily a bad one, but made at the wrong moment from Najem. When the wingback has rejoined the back line, Najem needs to find Bedoya in space.)

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These plays demonstrate that a three-back system is not inherently more effective than the 4-2-3-1/4-3-3 deployed by Philly. Although a three-back shape can provide numerical advantages in wide areas with wingbacks blitzing upfield after turnovers, it can leave center backs chasing out to cover jinky wingers in space. These matchups are sometimes called qualitative advantages because the situation very much favors the skillset of one of the players involved. Marcus Epps was far from the best he’s shown on Saturday, but getting him and Ilsinho into 1v1s with center backs is a good thing for the Union to do against Columbus’ shape.

Yet, the Union did not continue to attack behind the wingbacks. At times, in fact, they seemed to forget this was where the space would be.

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In the 16th minute, Najem again played an errant pass into a corner, but this time his decision-making was good and the run was not up to snuff. Ilsinho checked in short despite having plenty of space up the left wing to take.

This, unfortunately, characterized the Union approach for the rest of the match — until at least the 58th minute when Jay Simpson finally tested the back line deep.

As the Union ceased looking to play behind the wingbacks, they lost momentum, and, eventually, the strategic battle in the game.

The shape of Columbus — defense

A 3-4-3, like most shapes, is rarely what it appears on paper. When the Crew lost the ball, they quickly retreated into a 5-man back line with two midfielders protecting the center and narrow wingers ahead of them looking to force play central or, at most, allow only wide passes that could quickly be closed down. To that end, they often matched up in a 3v3 shape up top when Philly dropped Medunjanin deep to start play, and they chased the ball back to John McCarthy, who connected 3 out of 9 passes in the first half and 2 out of 9 in the second half. Of those completed passes, few made it to a friendly foot after Epps nodded them on.

The Union then ended up trying to play around the front three by pulling their fullbacks deep for simple passes. Ray Gaddis in particular spent a lot of time on the ball in the first half, and he completed a plethora of short passes into the center. The Crew would quickly move the wingback forward to Gaddis, pull an inside winger deeper to back-pressure the ball carrier, and slide their midfield two across to cover. This meant Philly could exit the space, but often only by going backward and giving the Crew time to rotate. When Jim Curtin spoke after the match about having little “possession with purpose,” these are the plays he was describing.

The shape of Columbus — offense

After the first fifteen minutes of the match, Columbus began controlling the width of the pitch. From then on it seemed as though the Union were merely hanging on. Even though the Crew rarely generated shots, they were so untroubled by Philly’s attack that they could afford to be patient and wait for spaces to open as the visitors tired.

Notably, the Crew have always prized width and movement off the ball under Gregg Berhalter, and the club’s current incarnation is no different. Central to the Crew’s attack was utilizing their attacking mids/central wingers to draw Philly central and attack up the flank. Both Kekuta Manneh and Justin Meram sought to draw the Union fullbacks inside to provide space for the wingbacks to advance. These movement patterns are difficult to monitor, particularly without C.J. Sapong narrowing the pitch.

In the 20th minute, the Crew began spreading the field effectively. Both Marcus Epps and Adam Najem drifted inside but failed to press the ball. Additionally, neither Bedoya nor Epps shadowed Meram’s central run, so Ray Gaddis followed the winger inside and left the touchline uncovered. It took two passes for the Crew to create chaos in back.

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With Philly unable to attack with width, Columbus increasingly found that Raitala and Harrison Afful (and Hector Jimenez after halftime) could leave the Union’s wingers behind and establish possession deep in the visitors’ half.

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Whereas the Crew used to press fullbacks up the pitch to create crossing opportunities or empty the center for a playmaker, the 3-4-3 offers positions that can lead to better quality chances. Indeed, when asked about trading chance quantity for quality after the match, Kekuta Manneh highlighted that all three of the front players had a high quality chance in the match. “I think it’s working to our advantage. We played it against Colorado and did not get a result. I think it’s working for us, we’re getting quality chances. I had one myself, Justin had one, Ola had one.”

Those high quality chances tend to come from trading crosses for opportunities to attack the box (which makes Jim Curtin’s post-match statement that the team needs to create more crosses a bit worrying, though after a match that produced two shots — neither on frame — it’s hard to go anywhere but up in terms of chance creation).

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The Crew’s goal was a prototypical example of creating a high quality chance by controlling the wide area of the pitch. Hector Jimenez pushed up on the right when Ilsinho moved inside. Giliano Wijnaldum stepped forward with Medunjanin and Elliott both in support but understandably hesitant to abandon the center. With Ilsinho dropping back, this gave the Union a numerical advantage but kept them at a positional disadvantage once Meram slipped out to the touchline ahead of Jimenez.

Such a situation is no guarantee of success, but once Jimenez found Artur and Ilsinho gave the midfielder space to turn, Philly was immediately in trouble. Note that Elliott remained hesitant to step to Meram throughout the ensuing play because Manneh was threatening to sneak behind him. Off the wing, often thought of as a less dangerous area of the pitch, Columbus had created a 3v2 advantage in the Union box. That is rarely good.

Attacking the Crew

These teams meet again in a few days. Can the Union come good at home?

Yes, absolutely.

For as much as Columbus wrestled away control of space — and the ball — from Philly, they were notably poor in execution. Additionally, the Union can identify clear soft spots in the Crew’s defensive setup that can be attacked in at least two ways.

First, the Union can do a better job recognizing and attacking the space behind Columbus’ wing backs in transition. Many times, Philly’s first ball off a turnover was sideways or backwards and gave Columbus time to recover their shape.

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Even when the Union did play it backwards, though, they still had opportunities to run at the home side’s back three and passed them up. Below, Marcus Epps has space in front of him following a turnover. He’s slow to put himself on the touchline to receive a pass, and when Gaddis looks up neither Epps nor Simpson is looking to run behind Lalas Abubakar even though the Crew defender has to cover both of them.

This echoes the play above in which Ilsinho checks short rather than identifying the space on the wing behind Afful, leaving Najem’s pass to roll harmlessly toward the corner.

The second tactic Philly can use involves more attacking movement from the center backs. Throughout the 2017 season, Jim Curtin has evolved his tactics to provide more defensive cover at the expense of attacking intent. The fullbacks rarely go forward together (and, in recent weeks, hardly at all) and the center backs tend to drop deep to find space to pass. These changes have certainly paid off defensively, but at this point the Union need to be able to vary their approach during the course of a match.

Columbus’ defensive approach early involved matching their front three against Philly’s central defenders and Medunjanin. The Union responded by using the hole behind the Crew’s front players. Columbus began leaving their attacking mids — particularly Meram — deeper to cut out long passes from the center backs. When the Union moved the ball to their left, Jonathan Mensah had the freedom to step out of the back three to press Ilsinho, which meant the Union could not create numerical advantages on that side.

Philly could have responded by dropping Ilsinho all the way into the first line of buildup, forcing either Mensah to step extremely high or hand off the Brazilian to Manneh. The issue, then, is that Ilsinho is not the player the Union would prefer to have on the ball behind the half line.

The other option is to have the center backs be more aggressive stepping forward with the ball. Below, Elliott and Yaro both have opportunities to step forward with the ball, drawing in the attacking mids and passing through them.

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As the Crew sat deeper, Elliott did take his space and found that it was fruitful.

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Above, Elliott steps forward to receive Medunjanin’s pass, meaning he is both moving toward goal and across the pitch when he collects the ball. This puts more pressure on the rotating defense and allows Ilsinho — offside though he is — to slide through a crack. Additionally, it forces Hector Jimenez to decide whether to protect the middle or stay close to Wijnaldum. Forcing defenders into split-second decisions is the name of the game in soccer, and the Union do not do it nearly enough.

Stretch it out

Bubbling beneath the surface of most of the Union’s problems was the absence of Fafa Picault, or more specifically, what Picault represents: Speed and depth.

Without their zippy winger, the Union had the same problem that plagued them last season: No ability to push the Crew’s defensive line deep and create space in the midfield. Television can be deceiving since the whole formation is rarely shown and directors have a strong penchant for close-ups, but it certainly appeared that Jay Simpson’s first real attempt to get behind the Columbus line occurred in the 58th minute. Without pushing the line back, which other teams do to the Union all too effectively, Philly was unable to create space in the center.

Execution

When a team secures a mere two shots, one of them blocked and the other from far outside the box, it is difficult to assess exactly what their attacking strategy was supposed to be. It is safe to assume the Union had one, though, and simply did not execute.

However, it is also safe to assume that whatever the strategy was, Jay Simpson did not know it or did not follow it well. Time and again, the man brought in to bolster the offense showed little awareness of his surroundings and found himself clogging the center instead of creating spaces.

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Simpson often checked into space, drew a defender, then…simply remained. When he pulled center backs high, he did not then look to exploit the space behind them. Above, you can see him draw Abubakar high then end up closing off Epps’ advance. In the second clip in this article, Simpson and Najem move into the same zone and Simpson has no awareness of his surroundings when Medunjanin picks him out.

Below, Simpson’s run gives no indication where he wants the ball during one of the few situations in which a Union player had a chance to pick out a cross.

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Going forward, how does Jim Curtin use Jay Simpson? His flashes of effectiveness have often occurred against lower-tier competition (and in a Toronto match marred by swirling winds). He can hold the ball up, but on a team without an advanced creative presence, that means simply bringing players uncomfortable in tight spaces into play…in tight spaces.

Simpson, ironically, may be approximately what the club said he was: A player that needs chances to score. And, given his height, not crosses. On a team that does not have a single key pass in their last two opening halves of play, he may need to move down the pecking order behind Charlie Davies.

Yaro needs minutes, but not MLS minutes

Nobody can watch Josh Yaro on the ball and argue that he has no future in a sport desperate for technical center backs.

Unfortunately, watching Josh Yaro off the ball leads one, almost inexorably, to the conclusion that this is a player that needs far more time to develop his awareness and positional sense. This is certainly not a knock on Yaro, but more of a call to do what is best for the player. Yaro could absolutely continue to play sporadically and lean heavily on his stellar athleticism to bail him out when, for example, a striker recognizes a play developing 2-3 steps before he does.

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And he could attempt to learn from experience to monitor runs across the line in order to step forward and cut out long passes (a skill often driven by confidence, and one Jack Elliott possesses in spades).

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But to reach his potential, Yaro needs to play and develop a stronger tactical sense, so he showcases his exceptional skillset in positive situations going forward.

In the end, the Union put forth an inexcusably pitiful showing, regardless of squad rotation, rest, or anything else. They collected two shots and neither was even close to threatening Zack Steffen’s goal.

More troubling, they failed to exploit Columbus’ weaknesses, pointing to either a lack of preparation or a lack of execution. On Wednesday, a far different level of focus must be evident from the outset if the Union want to save their season and make a run at the playoffs.